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How do radical religious sects run such deadly terrorist organizations? Hezbollah, Hamas, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Taliban all began as religious groups dedicated to piety and charity. Yet once they turned to violence, they became horribly potent, executing campaigns of terrorism deadlier than those of their secular rivals.
In Radical, Religious and Violent, Eli Berman approaches the question using the economics of organizations. He argues that these terrorists (even suicide terrorists) are best understood as rational altruists seeking to help their own communities. Yet despite the vast pool of potential recruits—young altruists who feel their communities are repressed or endangered —there are less than a dozen highly lethal terrorist organizations in the world capable of sustained and coordinated violence that threatens governments and makes hundreds of millions of civilians hesitate before boarding an airplane. What is special about these organizations, and why are most of their followers religious radicals?
Drawing on parallel research on radical religious Jews, Christians, and Muslims, Berman shows that the most lethal terrorist groups have a common characteristic: their leaders have found a way to control defection. Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Taliban, for example, built loyalty and cohesion by means of mutual aid, weeding out “free riders” and producing a cadre of members they could rely on. The secret of their deadly effectiveness lies in their resilience and cohesion when incentives to defect are strong.
These insights suggest that provision of basic social services by competent governments adds a critical, nonviolent component to counterterrorism strategies. It undermines the violent potential of radical religious organizations without disturbing free religious practice, being drawn into theological debates with jihadists, or endangering civilians.
Preface to the South Asian Edition Acknowledgments Note to Readers
1 Why Are Religious Terrorists So Lethal? Hezbollah The Taliban Hamas The Lethality of Religious Radicals What Motivates Terrorists? The Afterlife and Other Myths Terrorists Organizations—Why So Few? Internal Economies and Organizational Efficiency What’s Coming?
2 The Defection Constraints Origins of the Taliban Trade Routes and Defection Coordinated Assault Terrorism and Defection—Hamas The Jewish Underground—Terrorists Who Overreached Hezbollah and Suicide Attacks The Mahdi Army in Iraq
3. Sects, Prohibitions and Mutual Aid: The Organizational Secrets of Religious Radicals Prohibitions and Sacrifices—the Benign Puzzles Where are the Dads? Mutual Aid Prohibitions and Clubs Evidence Fertility Pronatalist Prohibitions Radical Islam and Fertility
4. Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice Subsidized Sacrifice Madrassas Subsidized Prohibitions and Fertility How Many Radical Islamists? Recap
5. The Hamas Model: Why Religious Radicals Are Such Effective Terrorists The "Hamas Model" Origins of the Mode Hamas Social Service Provision by the Taliban, Hezbollah, and al-Sadr Why Religious Radicals Are Such Lethal Terrorists Terrorist Clubs Evidence When Terrorists Fail Clubs and Violence without Religion Gratuitous Cruelty Objections
6. Why Suicide Attacks? Rebels, Insurgents, and Terrorists Suicide Attacks Evidence Coreligionists Are Soft Targets Clubs Alternative Explanations The Future of Suicide Attacks?
7. Constructive Counterterrorism How Terrorist Clubs Succeed Constructive Counterterrorism What's Wrong with the Old-Fashioned Methods? Where to Start? The Malayan Precedent
8. Religious Radicals and Violence in the Modern World Radical Christians, Benign and Violent The Supernatural and Credibility Markets and Denominations Jewish and Muslim Denominations What's Wrong with Religion in Government? Competition and Pluralism Not about Us What's Our Role?
Analytical Appendix The Defection Constraint Clubs, Loyalty, and Outside Options Suicide Attacks vs. Hard Targets Protecting Hard Targets by Improving Outside Options
Notes References Index