


New book delves into India's nuclear doctrine evolution

Joshi has authored the book with American scholar Frank O'Donnell. The books shed light on the evolution of India's nuclear doctrine since 1999 and the challenges it faces.

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Joshi has authored the book with American scholar Frank O'Donnell. (Image Credit: Wikipedia)

India has come a long way from being a "nuclear pariah" to a **nuclear** weapons state and it now needs to maintain a "credible **nuclear** deterrent" while avoiding accidental and inadvertent escalation, an expert said today.

Yogesh Joshi, a MacArthur Nuclear Security Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, and co-author of 'India in Nuclear Asia: Evolution of Regional Forces, Perceptions, and Policies', shared his views after the launch of the **book** at Teen Murti Bhawan in New Delhi.

"India has come a long way from being a **nuclear** pariah to a de facto **nuclear** weapons state. The need now is to see that **India** maintains a credible **nuclear deterrent** while avoiding dangers of accidental and inadvertent escalation," he said.

Joshi has authored the [book](#) with American scholar Frank O'Donnell. The books shed light on the evolution of India's [nuclear](#) doctrine since 1999 and the challenges it faces.

India's first [nuclear](#) doctrine was declared in 1999 after the [nuclear](#) tests in 1998; it was revised in 2003.

"Twenty years after [India](#) became a [nuclear](#) weapons state, its [nuclear](#) capabilities have seen tremendous improvement. In the [book](#), we have made two broad suggestions - New [Delhi](#), Beijing and Islamabad should hold [dialogues](#) on [nuclear](#) issues, and a public defence review must be done by India," O'Donnell said.

A Stanton Junior Faculty Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, O'Donnell said the work on the [book](#) began in 2013. The authors relied on public government statements for their research.

During a panel discussion after the launch, defence expert Arvind Gupta said:

"India's [nuclear](#) doctrine is not for fighting a war, but meant to stop [nuclear](#) coercion and to make sure no one uses it against us."

He also referred to "credible [minimum](#) deterrence" mentioned in India's first [nuclear](#) doctrine in 1999.

According to the 1999 doctrine, "India's [nuclear](#) forces will be effective, enduring, diverse, flexible, and responsive to the requirements in accordance with the concept of credible [minimum](#) deterrence."

"While suggestions that [India](#), Pakistan and [China](#) should have dialogue on [nuclear](#) issues sounds good theoretically but not very plausible practically. With [China](#), [nuclear](#) is not the main issue... And jumping into a [nuclear](#) dialogue without proper security dialogue won't be very wise," Gupta said.

Providing an overview of India's [nuclear](#) forces as it stands in 2018, the [book](#) studies the implications that the [nuclear](#) postures of India's two main adversaries - Pakistan and [China](#) - have on its [nuclear](#) strategy.

The [book](#) explores India's relations with countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Syria, and how these reveal India's global non-proliferation policy approaches.

It delves into key [nuclear](#) concepts such as 'no-first-use', 'credible [minimum](#) deterrence', 'full spectrum deterrence' and 'minimum deterrence' in the context of the emergence of the Arihant nuclear-armed submarine fleet and the Agni-V and prospective Agni-VI intercontinental-range missiles.

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